The two level-games of the Japan-United States Security Treaty

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12104/49511

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.date.accessioned	2015-09-21T23:23:14Z	-
dc.date.available	2015-09-21T23:23:14Z	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12104/49511	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.publicaciones.cucsh.udg.mx/cuaderno/edosoc/edo-04.htm
dc.description	Using Robert Putnam's Two Level-Games model that offers a way for analyzing international negotiations in which the first level refers to bargaining among state's representatives to reach an agreement while at the second level those same negotiators seek ratification from legislatures bureaucracies and interest groups at the domestic level Arturo Santa Cruz makes a detailed analysis of the negotiations leading to the 1952 and 1959 Japan-United States security treaties
dc.format	application/PDF	-
dc.language.iso	spa	-
dc.publisher	Biblioteca Digital wdg.biblio	-
dc.publisher	Universidad de Guadalajara
dc.relation.ispartofseries	División de Estudios sobre Estado y Sociedad
dc.subject	Level-games of the Japan-United States Security Treaty
dc.subject	Inglés
dc.subject	Relaciones Internacionales
dc.title	The two level-games of the Japan-United States Security Treaty
dc.type	Libro
dc.type.conacyt	book	-
dc.rights.access	OpenAccess	-
dc.department	CUCSH	-
dc.rights.udg	https://www.riudg.udg.mx/info/politicas.jsp	-
Appears in Collections:	Títulos individuales

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